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ABSTRACT: This article aims at answering the question whether the Commission’s 
proposal intended to empower Member States’ competition authorities to be more 
effective enforcers (ECN+ Directive) actually brings effective solutions to all weak-
nesses of Regulation 1/2003, which influenced an inefficient application of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU in some Member States (among them Poland, which will be taken 
as a point of reference). 
The first part of the article constitutes a review upon the application of Regulation 
1/2003 in Poland. Interestingly, the beginning of its enforcement coincides with the 
total period of application of EU law in Poland, since the country joined the EU on 
the same day the Regulation entered into force. The problem with Regulation 1/2003 
is that it does not seem to enhance the enforcement of the Community’s competition 
rules by national enforcers, including NCAs and courts. The reason for this failure lies 
inter alia in the deficiencies of the principles adopted in the Regulation itself, includ-
ing a lack of procedural unification (or at least some harmonisation) in cases where 
European substantive law is to be applied. 
In the second part of the article, the content of the Commission’s proposal on ECN+ 
Directive is analysed in order to find whether new regulations are able to solve prob-
lems identified in the Polish application of the Treaty’s provisions. The article con-
cludes with an overall assessment of the proposed Directive and a list of conditions for 
effective implementation of the Directive. 
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1. Introductory remarks
Regulation 1/2003 was based on a quite brave concept: its objective was 
to assure the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in a single (uni-
form) manner across the EU; yet, no a concrete harmonisation of pro-
cedural rules was foreseen therein.1 Some instruments for harmonising 
some procedural issues can, indeed, be found in Regulation 1/2003, such 
as a catalogue of decisions that can be adopted by national competi-
tion authorities in cases based on Treaty provisions, but jurisprudence 
shows that even a provision laid down in this instrument (Article 5 of 
Regulation 1/2003) has caused serious problems in its interpretation.2 The 
Commission’s report assessing the implementation of Regulation 1/2003 
(hereafter, Anniversary Communication)3 created the impression that, by 
enforcing Regulation 1/2003, European institutions (the Council as a legal 
maker, but predominantly the Commission as a law initiator) had hoped 
for a sort of spontaneous harmonisation of the European Competition 
Network, which – even if not founded directly by Regulation 1/2003 – 
was mentioned in its motives and eventually set up on the basis of the 
Commission’s communication.4 It is remarkable that, in the Anniversary 
Communication, both ECN’s existence and its initiatives were high-
lighted as the key (the only?) achievement of Regulation 1/2003.5 In 2014, 
the Commission honestly presented itself as disillusioned – a uniform 
1 A problem of an influence of differences between procedural rules upon results of applying EU 
and national rules was highlighted by e.g. Kati Cseres, “The impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the 
New Member States,” The Competition Law Review 6, no. 2 (2010): 161, 182. The author states: 
“Diverging procedural rules demonstrate that national procedural autonomy is still a powerful 
influencing device on the outcome of enforcement of EU rules” (182). 
2 Judgement of the Court of Justice of 3 May 2011, Tele 2 v. President of Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection, C-375/09, EU:C:2011:270.
3 Communication from the Commission – Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 
1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives (COM (2014) 453, 9.7.2014).
4 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, [2004] 
OJ C 101/43.
5 Doubts on the compliance of ECN’s activities with the rule of law are correctly pointed by 
Giorgio Monti, “Independence, interdependence and legitimacy: The EU Commission, National 
Competition Authorities, and the European Competition Network”, EUI Working Paper LAW 1 
(2014): 16-18.
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application of EU competition law without a previous harmonisation of 
procedural rules was, indeed, impossible. 
In 2017, after thirteen years of application of Regulation 1/20036, most 
antitrust lawyers, including some from the Commission, were deeply 
convinced that a time for a change had come. This expectation was pre-
liminarily met by a Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council to empower Member States’ competition authorities 
to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of 
the internal market,7 commonly known as the ECN+ Directive Proposal. 
The very basic question arising in the context of the draft Directive which 
should be profoundly reflected upon is: will a planned ECN+ Directive 
be able to eliminate all weaknesses of a current system of enforcement of 
EU competition rules in Member States? One of the goals of this article is 
to answer this question by taking into consideration the case of Poland – 
a large country with a considerable economy that turned out to be a very 
inefficient enforcer of EU competition rules. 
In order to achieve this goal, the article is divided into five sections. The 
first is an introduction. The second one summarises and comments on the 
Polish antitrust practice regarding Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.8 The third 
section identifies Poland’s key problems regarding the application of EU 
competition rules – both the Treaty rules and Regulation 1/2003 – at a 
national level. This list differs from the list of gaps contained in the ECN+ 
Directive proposal,9 but it sums up the Polish experience. Simultaneously, 
the second section brings Regulation 1/2003’s weaknesses into view from 
a Polish perspective. In the fourth part of the article, the content of the 
ECN+ Directive Proposal is analysed from a standpoint of the problems 
identified in the previous section. The article finishes with section five, 
6 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1, 1-25. The genesis of this 
Regulation is interestingly presented by Wouter Wils, “Ten years of Regulation 1/2003 – A retro-
spective”, Journal of Competition Law and Practice 4, no. 4 (2013) (version available from SSRN, 
hereafter: SSRN’s version). 
7 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the com-
petition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market, Brussels, 22.3.2017, COM(2017) 142 final, {SWD(2017) 114}, 
{SWD(2017) 115}, {SWD(2017) 116}; hereafter: the ECN+ Directive Proposal or the draft Directive.
8 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2012] OJ C 
326/47.  
9 See ECN+ Proposal, 2-3 (under the heading: Reasons for and objectives of the proposal).
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which provides an overall assessment of the proposed Directive, accom-
panied by a list of conditions for effective implementation of the Directive 
in Poland. 
2. Poland: the (poor) story of an application of Regulation 1/2003
For Poland, 1 May 2004 was not only the day Regulation 1/2003 entered 
into force, but also (as for other nine of the (current) 28 Member States) 
a memorable day regarding the country’s accession to the EU with all its 
policies (competition policy included). The so-called “new” Member States 
Regulation 1/2003 was not only considered as revolutionary, but also as a 
starting point for the enforcement of EU competition rules. Therefore, the 
assessment of the application of Regulation 1/2003 in the new Member 
States regards a “pure” application of Regulation 1/2003, not influenced 
by a comparison between “new” and “old” regimes (Regulation 17/62). But 
this is probably the beginning and the end of the differences between EU 
“newcomers” and EU incumbent Member States in terms of the applica-
tion of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU on the basis of Regulation 1/2003.10 
Therefore, all the remarks and conclusions presented in this article can be 
successfully applied to many (if not all) national antitrust regimes in the 
EU. 
Until the end of 2016,11 the President of the Competition and Consumer 
Protection Office (NCA in Poland, hereafter, UOKiK) only completed 
23 antitrust proceedings based on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The total 
number of proceedings based on the Treaty provisions is not clear because 
until 2012 UOKiK did not contain such data in its annual reports. Detailed 
information is presented below in Table 1. 
10 However, see an interesting analysis of the application of EU competition rules in small new 
Member States: Jurgita Malinauskaite, “Public EU competition law enforcement in small ‘newer’ 
Member States: Addressing the challenges”, The Competition Law Review 12, no. 1 (2016): 19-52.
11 At the  submission date of this paper, the full data on UOKiK’s activity were not available yet. 
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Table 1. Number of antitrust proceedings based on Article 101  
and/or Article 102 TFEU initiated, continued and completed  
by the Polish competition authority between 2004 and 2016.
Year
Number of proceedings 
initiated
Number of proceedings 
continued





































2011 No data  available No data available
1 (101)
0 (102)




















2006 No data  available 11 (101 & 102)
1 (101)
3 (102)










Source: Author’s analysis of UOKiK’s annual reports, available at: www.uokik.gov.pl (15 January 2018).
NDAR The number of envisaged decisions (Article 11(4) of Regulation 
1/2003) in Poland between 2004 and 2017 is really modest. ECN’s statistics 
show a much larger number of such decisions in many “new” Member States, 
which can be quite surprising, considering the fact that Poland constitutes 
the largest market out of all new EU Member States and the sixth market 
in the whole EU. A competition authority in Hungary issued 41 decisions, 
M&CLR_II_2.indd   129 29/10/2018   14:59:50
130  Market and Competition Law Review / volume ii / no. 2 / october 2018 / 125-150
in Lithuania - 16, in Romania - 36, and in Slovakia - 23, while Poland only 
issued 13.12 W.P.J. Wils noticed that Poland and the United Kingdom are 
“the notable exceptions” to the rule that the largest Member States adopt the 
largest number of decisions based on Article 101 and/or Article 102 TFEU.13 
Not only the total number of decisions, but also the scope of UOKiK’s 
activity regarding the application of EU competition rules is disappoint-
ing. It would be expectable that the number of Polish national antitrust 
proceedings based on Article 101 and/or Article 102 TFEU would increase 
(or at least not decrease) given the fact that Regulation 1/2003 has been 
in force for many years, the co-operation within ECN has grown and the 
competition authority itself has gained some experience in applying the 
Treaty’s competition rules. But what is striking while analysing UOKiK’s 
activity is the significant decrease in initiating (and consequently conduct-
ing and completing) antitrust proceedings with EU dimension (compar-
ing the periods ranging from 2005-2009 and 2010-2016).
It is doubtful whether the real reason for UOKiK’s inactivity regard-
ing the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is the lack of infringe-
ments with EU dimensions, because to some point this decrease reflects 
the performance of a national competition policy. The number of anti-
trust proceedings initiated and completed by the UOKiK has decreased 
in recent years – this situation is a consequence of a set of factors of differ-
ent natures. First of all, since April 2007 antitrust proceedings before the 
Polish competition authority regarding EU competition rules can only be 
started ex officio. Secondly, the President of UOKiK is not only a competi-
tion authority, but simultaneously an authority in a vast area of consumer 
cases, which surely has an impact on the quality of the competition policy. 
Moreover, a record of antitrust decisions issued by the President of 
UOKiK in recent years shows that a majority of them concerned abuses of 
dominant position on local markets of public utility services and hardly any 
infringements of this kind are subject to Article 102 TFEU. For a long time, 
decisions concerning infringements of a prohibition of anticompetitive 
agreements (Article 6 of Polish Competition Act14) in vertical agreements 
rather dominated in Poland. Then, a great number of antitrust decisions 
concerned bid rigging on local market. Again, these types of restrictions 
12 All data available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html (15 January 2018). 
13 Wouter Wils, “Ten Years”, 9.
14 Act of 16 February 2007 on Competition and Consumer Protection, consolidated text: Polish 
Journals of Law 2017, item 229, 1089, 1132. 
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of competition can rarely be caught by Article 101 TFEU, mainly because 
of the absence of impact on intra-EU trade patterns. Surely, also some defi-
ciencies of Regulation 1/2003 that will be discussed later in this article can 
be (at least partly) blamed for a poor performance of the Polish competi-
tion authority in the application of EU antitrust provisions. 
3. Key problems of applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU at national level 
3.1. (Modest) analysis of an “impact on trade among EU Member States” 
What seems to be specific for the Polish record of decisions based on 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is that, in a vast majority of cases, violations 
of Treaty provisions confirmed by a national competition authority regard 
these categories of restrictions of competition (categories defined mainly 
by a relevant market and its characteristics, type of industry (business), 
and type and size of a company, which in the past used to be declared 
as violating Articles 101 or 102 TFEU by the Commission). Restricting 
competition on a domestic gas market – as in the PGNiG cases – was 
considered to have an impact on intra-EU trade, as in the Commission’s 
decisions in the Gaz de France/Suez15 and Total/Gaz de France16 cases. It is 
also possible to find analogies in a record of the Commission’s decisions 
for other cases assessed by the Polish competition authority: ZAIKS (e.g. 
the Commission’s decisions in the GEMA17 and SACEM18 cases), Wrigley 
(Mars/Wrigley case19), PPL (e.g. Alpha Fight Services/Aéroports de Paris 
case20), or the interchange fee case (Visa case21). The Polish competition 
authority does not seem to be very brave or adventurous in identifying 
brand new markets subject to an impact on intra-EU trade. 
Any qualitative analysis of the impact on trade as a prerequisite for apply-
ing Article 101 and 102 TFEU in “Polish” cases is very general and is mainly 
limited to the statement that an impact on trade is “potential”. There are no 
analyses on how a particular practice can pertain internal market objectives.
15 Decision of the European Commission, 14 November 2006, COMP/M.4180 Gaz de France/Suez. 
16 Decision of the European Commission, 8 October 2004, COMP/M.3410 Total/Gaz de France.  
17 Decision of the European Commission, 2 June 1971, IV/26.760 GEMA, OJ 1973 L 134.
18 Decision of the European Commission, 12 August 2002, COMP/C2/37.219 Banghalter/Homem 
Christo (Daft Punk) v. SACEM.
19 Decision of the European Commission, 28 July 2008, COMP/M.5188, Mars/Wrigley.
20 Decision of the European Commission 98/513/EC, 11 June 1998 r., Alpha Fight Services/
Aéroports de Paris, OJ L 230/10.
21 Decision of the European Commission, 24 July 2002, COMP/29.373, Visa. 
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3.2.  (Lack of) coherent interpretation of EU and national substantive 
competition rules 
3.2.1. (Lack of) full identity of national substantive competition rules
According to Article 3(1) of Regulation 1/2003, Member States “shall also 
apply” Articles 101 and 102 TFEU together with national competition rules.
It is true that competition rules in Poland and other Central European 
countries, just as those in Cyprus and Malta (which also accessed the EU 
on 1 May 2004), have followed the EU regulatory pattern to a great extent. 
Prerequisites for applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, excluding the con-
dition of an impact on trade, are just the same as those contained in – 
respectively – Article 6 and Article 9 of the Polish Competition Act. EU 
Member States have achieved a certain level of (even if non-mandatory) 
“harmonization” of national antitrust rules regarding prohibitions of anti-
competitive practices, but this “harmonization” did not concern a way in 
which substantive rules are formulated in a national law, as well as instru-
ments of competition policy at EU and national law can differ (and in real-
ity they often do). This factor has an inevitable influence upon the applica-
tion of Regulation 1/2003 by national competition authorities. 
What seems to be irritating is the fact that national competition authori-
ties seem to ignore the existing disparities between EU and national sub-
stantive antitrust rules, which results in the fact that the application of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is limited to assessing a possible impact on 
trade between EU Member States – the rest of the conditions for apply-
ing the Treaty’s provisions are assessed in the same way as the conditions 
established in a national law. 
The need for a separate assessment of prerequisites concerning prohi-
bitions of anticompetitive practices stated in EU and national law was 
indirectly confirmed by a position of the Commission acting as amicus 
curiae in a proceeding before the Austrian court in the Schenker case. The 
Commission claimed that even if an agreement has a de minimis status in 
accordance with a national law, it cannot be protected from being subject 
to the application of Article 101 TFEU.22 
22 See judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 June 2013, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde and 
Bundeskartellanwalt v. Schenker & Co. AG and Others, C-681/11, EU:C:2013:404. 
Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 230 – Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement 
under Regulation 1/2003 (SWD(2014) 230/2, 9.7.2014),  paragraph 250. 
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National competition authorities have to bear in mind that when apply-
ing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU they have to take into consideration a 
whole acquis communautaire corresponding to these provisions, includ-
ing CJEU’s jurisprudence. On the other hand, in a process of application 
of a national law, EU case-law may have a limited meaning. The Polish 
Supreme Court took a very clear position on this in a few judgments.23 
As for Poland, the problem seems to be highly visible in the reference to 
the existence of a dominant position. In EU law there is no legal definition of 
dominant position, so an assessment of this concept may be more flexible. 
If a dominant position is determined in a process of application of Article 
102 TFEU, a market share as a quantitative criterion of dominance can 
even be ignored, which is absolutely impossible under Polish law because 
the criterion of market share constitutes an element of the legal definition 
of dominance contained in Article 4.10 of the Polish Competition Act.24 
What is more, according to Article 4.10 of the Competition Act, a market 
share above 40% creates a legal presumption that an undertaking holds 
a dominant position. Even if this presumption is rebuttable, the position 
of a (possibly dominant) undertaking should be different when applying 
EU law and national law. Under EU law, it is the competition authority 
who should prove a market dominance from the very beginning. Under 
national law, though, if there is a proceeding against an undertaking hold-
ing more than 40% of the market, the presumption works and it is the 
company’s burden to prove that it is not dominant on a relevant market. 
So far, this problem has not arisen in Polish case law based on Article 102 
TFEU since all decisions related to abuse of dominance addressed compa-
nies which were more than dominant (even quasi-monopolistic) – as the 
President of UOKiK claimed in the PGNiG II decision:25 a company whose 
market share is about 95% holds such a significant position on a market 
in relation to its contractors and competitors that “it is simply impossible 
to say that it is not dominant on a market”. The same could apply to cases 
Wrigley (85-90%) or ZAIKS (100%).
23 Resolution of the Supreme Court of 23 July 2008, III CZP 52/08.
24 Article 4.10 of the Polish Competition Act: “dominant position shall mean an undertaking’s 
market position which allows it to prevent effective competition in a relevant market thus enabling 
it to act to a significant degree independently of its competitors, contracting parties and consum-
ers; it is assumed that an undertaking holds a dominant position if its market share in the relevant 
market exceeds 40%”.
25 Decision of the President of UOKiK, of 13 April 2012, DOK-1/2012 (available in Polish on 
UOKiK’s website).
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Differences similar to these concerning an abuse of dominance are 
also linked with the application of the de minimis rule. Under EU law, 
this is a rule established in a soft law26 and even if it seems fundamen-
tal and well-founded in EU competition law, it has some limitations con-
cerning its binding force, as a judgment in the Expedia27 case showed.28 In 
Polish competition law, the de minimis rule is expressed in Article 7 of the 
Competition Act; therefore, it has the status of a hard law with an “abso-
lute” binding force, as the Polish Competition Act does not predict any 
possibility of abandoning this rule in any circumstances. The substance of 
the de minimis rules in EU and Polish law is also slightly different: Article 
7 of the Polish Competition Act establishes lower market shares for agree-
ments of minor importance than the ones stated in the Commission’s 
communication (5% for horizontal agreements and 10% for vertical agree-
ments in Poland against 10% and 15% in EU law, respectively).  
The same applies to block exemptions. Polish block exemptions are gen-
erally patterned on EU group exemptions, but – unlike EU regulations29 
– they do not contain any provision allowing the President of UOKiK to 
withdraw block exemption benefits in case of an agreement, theoretically 
meeting all exempting conditions stated in the Regulation. This brings us 
to the conclusion that applying a group exemption rule on the basis of a 
national law may lead to finishing an antitrust proceeding without adopt-
ing any decisions confirming an infringement, even in a situation where 
the Commission – due to extraordinary circumstances – would not apply 
a block exemption.
The legal (and economic!) sense of de minimis rules and block exemp-
tions is the same in EU and Polish law, but differences in the methodology 
of their application, as well as in their dimension, are so fundamental that 
they exclude the possibility of a uniform application when applying Article 
101 TFEU and Article 6 of the Polish Competition Act. 
26 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict com-
petition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis 
Notice), [2014] OJ C 57/1.
27 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 13 December 2012, C-226/11 Expedia Inc. v. 
Autorité de la concurrence and others, EU:C:2012:795.
28 The Polish Supreme Court also denied a binding force of EU soft law for national authorities 
(judgment of 7 July 2011, III SK 16/09). 
29 See Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No. 2821/71 of the Council of 20 December 1971 on the appli-
cation of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices, 
[1971] OJ L 285/46. 
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3.2.2. (Non-) EU competition policy priorities of in a national practice
Since nowadays competition authorities are not able (due to limited 
human, organizational, and financial resources) to react to all distortions 
of competition occurring in a real economy, they set priorities concerning 
their (competition) policy. In Poland, there is a governmental programme 
which prescribes competition protection goals for a certain period. In the 
EU, though, these priorities are formulated  merely in a political statement 
of the Competition Commissioner30 and in the Commission’s communi-
cations – the best example is the Communication from the Commission 
on its enforcement priorities regarding the application of Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conducts by dominant undertakings.31 
Competition policy priorities at EU and national level do not have to be 
the same – thus, an important question arises: are national competition 
authorities obliged to take into consideration EU competition policy priori-
ties indicated by the Commission? The answer to this question should be 
“yes” if Regulation 1/2003 is to fulfil its basic role – to guarantee a decen-
tralised but uniform application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. But if EU 
competition policy priorities are considered by national authorities as key 
instructions for applying EU antitrust rules, this can easily lead to a situa-
tion where applying identical substantive rules results in different decisions 
concerning the existence (or non-existence) of a anticompetitive practice. 
Let me take the above mentioned Commission’s communication on Article 
102 TFEU as an example. To make a long story short, the idea of this com-
munication is a concentration on the fight against exclusionary abuses 
instead of investing time and money in dealing with exploitative practices. 
Just like Article 102 TFEU, Article 9 of the Polish Competition Act, stating 
a prohibition of any abuse of dominance, does not directly identify two 
categories of practices (exclusionary and exploitative). But the catalogue of 
exemplary abuses of a dominant position contained in Article 9(2) of the 
Polish Competition Act is much longer when compared to the list of abuses 
in Article 102 TFEU. The enforcement of Article 9 of the Competition Act 
by the President of UOKiK usually starts with (and quite often it is lim-
ited to) a qualification of an undertaking’s behaviour as one of the practices 
listed in a catalogue of abuses under Article 9(2). If it is impossible because 
a particular behaviour does not meet all the elements of a certain type of 
30 E.g. speech by Joaquin Almunia, Fighting against cartels: A priority for the present and for the future, 
SPEECH/14/281, 3 April 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-281_en.htm.
31 [2009] OJ C 45/7.
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practice, then the President of UOKiK applies the “general clause” – a “gen-
eral” prohibition of abuse of a dominant position contained in Article 9(1). 
It is not an objective of this article to judge whether such a methodology is 
correct or to decide on a relationship between a general clause stating the 
prohibition of an abuse and a catalogue of exemplary abuses. However, this 
is a methodology followed in the majority of cases by the antitrust practice 
(either by the President of UOKiK or by Polish competition courts). As a 
result, if all elements of a particular type of abuse – whether exclusion-
ary or exploitative – are present in a certain behaviour, the President of 
UOKiK confirms an infringement of Article 9 of the Polish Competition 
Act and – consequently – Article 102 TFEU. It is improbable that a national 
competition authority will quit a case that can be qualified as an abuse of 
dominance in the light of a national law (and in fact in the light of the direct 
wording of Article 102 TFEU) only because it is an exploitative, not exclu-
sionary practice, which in the context of the Commission’s Guidelines on 
Article 102 could even be considered as totally legal. 
Even the Commission admits that priorities of cases based on Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU differ in NCAs’ practice. According to data presented 
in the Anniversary Communication (paragraph 14), decisions on abuses 
of a dominant position constitute only 1/5 (20%) of all the Commission’s 
antirust decisions and almost 1/3 (32%) of NCAs’ decisions concerning the 
application of EU competition law. Decisions on vertical restraints account 
for merely 1/10 (9%) of the Commission’s decisional practice, whereas they 
account for almost 1/5 (18%) of NCAs’ decisions based on the Treaty’s 
provisions. As stated above (section 2), in Poland decisions on vertical 
restraints predominated for many years.
The statistics presented above require an answer to the question whether 
a lack of compliance of priorities with the application of EU antitrust rules 
on a central and “decentralised” level results in a loss of coherence of EU 
competition policy. Data presented by the Commission also call for a 
research on how NCAs implement an effects-based approach when apply-
ing EU competition law.
3.2.3. (Different) axiologies of national and EU competition rules 
Another factor that in my view does not a allow a total coherence in the appli-
cation of EU and national competition rules (which in fact allows for con-
testing the adequacy of the whole concept of an enforcement regime under 
Regulation 1/2003) is the axiology of both systems for protecting competition.
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Even if it is taken for granted that nowadays the “pure” protection of 
competition is a much more important goal of EU law than supporting 
the integration (and creation) of the single internal market, EU law cannot 
be – by its nature – totally free from achieving this “integration” goal. It 
directly results from Protocol No. 26 to the Treaty of Lisbon, where com-
petition rules are mentioned as an imminent part of regulations support-
ing the functioning of the internal market. No “integration goal” (defined 
as above) seems to be visible in decisions of national competition authori-
ties, especially if it is not identified with a condition of appreciable impact 
on intra-EU trade. Regarding the necessity to include an “integration” goal 
in the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU at a national level, the 
question arises whether it is possible at all to apply EU and domestic com-
petition law in a truly and totally uniform manner.
In this context I would like to highlight the following problem: Article 10 
of Regulation 1/2003 mentions the compliance of a Commission’s decision 
with EU public interest as a condition for adopting a decision on non-appli-
cation of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU, either because a practice does not meet 
the conditions for prohibitions of anticompetitive practices or because an 
agreement meets the exemption criteria set in Article 101(3) TFEU or in the 
de minimis Notice (“Where the Community public interest relating to the 
application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty so requires (...)”). If a national 
competition authority takes an analogical decision on a non-application of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003, which requires 
in such a situation a decision on “no ground to action on its part”, does 
not demand from NCAs any reference to EU’s interest. It is impressive that 
national competition authorities are not obliged to consider EU’s interest in 
their decisional practice in the same factual and legal situations in which 
the Commission must, although it is quite clear that in a substantive sense 
NCAs’ decision on no ground to act on their part is the same as a decision 
on the non-application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and only because of 
formal issues – in order not to eliminate the possibility to conduct a pro-
ceeding by other institutions, mainly the Commission – NCAs are not able 
to adopt decisions on non-application of Treaty provisions (this issue was 
definitely ruled by the Court of Justice in “Polish” case C-375/09 Tele 232.
32 See a positive comment on this judgment by Ilona Szwedziak, “Is the parallel competence set out 
in Regulation 1/2003 totally clear? Case comment to the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice 
of 3 May 2011 Tele 2 v. Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów (Case C-375/09)”, 
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 5, no. 7 (2011): 263-273. 
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3.3. (Partly) simultaneous application of EU and national competition rules
Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 predicts that the enforcement of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU is possible only within a proceeding where EU law is applied 
altogether with a national law. Let us imagine that a national authority is 
convinced about a distortion of competition by an agreement that – in the 
light of a national law – is caught by a block exemption, but does not need 
to be subject to EU block exemption because of a withdrawal of benefits by 
the Commission (this problem was summarised in section 3.2.1 above). Is 
a national competition body entitled to continue a proceeding only on the 
basis of Article 101 TFEU? Such a problem remains actually unsolved by 
Regulation 1/2003. Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 refers to the simultane-
ous application of EU and national law. What the Council probably meant 
by “application” is making a decision (by a competition authority) on the 
substance of a case – this may be a decision declaring a violation of Article 
101 or Article 102 TFEU or an exempting decision based on Article 101(3) 
TFEU. In my view, e.g. a decision to abandon a proceeding as a result of 
applying a national block exemption is in fact a decision on the substance 
of a case; therefore, it is a decision on the application of a national compe-
tition law. Unfortunately, due to some discrepancies in EU and national 
laws, the result of applying national and EU rules is totally different. If 
such a factor were to be considered as a reason to quit a proceeding con-
cerning Article 101 TFEU by a national authority, the idea of decentralisa-
tion would be distorted. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that any competition 
authority would take the risk of continuing a proceeding solely in rela-
tion to Article 101 TFEU – the direct wording of Article 3 of Regulation 
1/2003 rather suggests that in the situation described above there is no 
ground for a national competition authority to continue a proceeding (in 
fact, the condition of simultaneous application of EU and national law 
is not met anymore), and such a proceeding should be taken over by the 
Commission. Even if such situations are marginal, EU regulation should 
somehow respond to the problem.
3.4.  Sanctions for violating Articles 101 and 102 TFEU: differentiation, 
multiplication
There are two basic problems with sanctions for violating Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU in a decentralised system of EU competition law enforce-
ment. The first one is the application of different sanctions for the same 
violation of common competition rules. One of the conditions for a totally 
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uniform application of EU and national competition rules is a uniformity 
of sanctions imposed on undertakings, regardless of whether Article 101 
or Article 102 were applied by the Commission or NCA. Yet, sanctions for 
antitrust practices are not unified or harmonised at all. In the Anniversary 
Communication (paragraph 36), the Commission claims that regarding 
administrative sanctions Member States achieved a high level of voluntary 
convergence because competition authorities operate a similar methodol-
ogy, but simultaneously it admits that there are still some differences con-
cerning principles for calculating fines, such as: basis for calculating the 
fine, basic amount of the fine, method of including in a fine a gravity and 
a period of infringement. For undertakings – potential addressees of deci-
sions imposing fines – these differences have a fundamental meaning.33
For instance, unlike Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003, which takes a 
turnover as a reference point for calculating a fine, Article 106(1) of the 
Polish Competition Act used to establish undertakings’ incomes as a base 
for calculating a fine. Under these circumstances, even if a methodology 
for calculating fines laid down in soft law is coherent (or even unified), 
its application leads to different results (fines of various amounts for a 
violation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, depending if they are imposed 
by the Commission or NCA in a particular Member State). Fortunately, 
in the Polish practice this problem was solved in the amendment of the 
Competition Act dated 10 June 2014 and, on 18 January 2015 (when the 
amendment entered into force), income was replaced by turnover as a base 
for calculating fines. 
But even if the discrepancy between EU and national competition law 
mentioned above was eliminated, the other fundamental difference, con-
cerning the leniency programme, still exists, even if this particular solu-
tion of Polish competition law has been widely criticised in the Polish doc-
trine.34 Poland belongs to a very narrow circle of countries where leniency 
applies not only to cartels, but also to vertical agreements. Indeed, a major-
ity of cases in which undertakings were granted immunity or reduction of 
a fine were about violations of a prohibition of anticompetitive agreements 
33 Divergences on administrative fines were correctly listed in paragraphs 70-76 of the Commission 
Staff Working Document enhancing competition enforcement by the Member States’ competi-
tion authorities: institutional and procedural issues: accompanying Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement 
under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives {COM(2014) 453} {SWD(2014) 230}.
34 Bartosz Turno, Leniency. Program łagodzenia kar pieniężnych w polskim prawie ochrony 
konkurencji, (Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer, 2013): 460-465 (published only in Polish).
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by vertical restraints. So, in many cases, an undertaking lenient in Poland 
would not be lenient in other Member States – it only confirms the fact that 
unless a leniency applicant makes multiple (and successful) applications 
across the EU, “there would be no real certainty of EU-wide immunity”35.
The fact that such broad categories of undertakings (including those 
engaged in vertical agreements) are allowed to benefit from leniency pro-
grammes may be considered as beneficial for companies, but it can also be 
treated – and a record of the decisions of the President of UOKiK confirms 
that – as a solution that actually makes leniency less effective over time. 
As a consequence, the effectiveness of the competition policy as such is 
diminished, which is surely against undertakings’ interests. 
The Polish system of sanctions for anticompetitive practices also raises 
another problem – the interaction between sanctions imposed on under-
takings and on individuals. They may be – but of course – sanctions for 
violating Article 101 TFEU36 – so, in fact, it is a question of effective sanc-
tioning for infringements of EU law. There are many problems to be solved 
in this area, among them the relation between sanctions suffered by a 
company and by a natural person in a situation where a company ben-
efits from a leniency. In the past, such a problem did not exist in Poland, 
as the Competition Act did not prescribe any sanctions on individuals, 
but Article 106a, in relation to Article 6a (which entered into force on 18 
January 2015), provides the possibility to impose a fine up to 2,000,000 
PLN (ca. 500,000 EUR) on individuals (“managing person”, as defined 
in Article 4.3a of the Competition Act). The Commission also notices 
the necessity of working out a proper (we prefer: well-balanced) relation 
between sanctions imposed on both categories of entities.37 
Apart from a possible differentiation of sanctions for the same infringe-
ment at EU and national level, a decentralised enforcement of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU brings a problem of multiplication of sanctions: concurrent 
(and different) sanctions which can be imposed by various NCAs conduct-
ing their national proceedings in the case of the same infringement. It can 
be assumed that solving this problem would be limited by the application 
35 Ionnis Lianos and Arianna Andreangeli, “The European Union: The competition law system 
and the Union’s norms”, in Design of Competition Law Institutions: Global Norms, Local Choices, 
eds. Eleanor M. Fox, Michael J. Trebilcock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 432.
36 A fine on a natural person may be imposed solely for an infringement of a prohibition of anti-
competitive agreements, not a prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position. 
37 Anniversary Communication, paragraph 42.
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ne bis in idem rule, but such a general statement seems a bit dissatisfy-
ing. A decision upon this issue in more detail at EU level has been highly 
expected by undertakings.  
In the Anniversary Communication, the Commission underlined the 
need to initiate some actions for enhancing a convergence of sanctions 
combined with a certain level of flexibility for NCAs in the calculation of 
fines in individual cases.38 It seems a good start for amending the existing 
regime. 
3.5.  Cooperation between the Commission and national institutions:  
far from the picture settled in Regulation 1/2003  
3.5.1. Poor cooperation of both the Commission and the national courts
Guaranteeing a uniform application of EU competition law in Member 
States is not exclusively the Commission’s task, it can be also attributed to 
national competition authorities (regardless of whether they are admin-
istrative or judicial). An obligation to contribute to a uniform application 
of the Treaty ś provisions can be easily drawn from the loyalty principle 
laid down in Article 4(3) TEU. Regulation 1/2003 provides some instru-
ments that can be used by national authorities to fulfil this obligation. 
Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 gives national courts the possibility to 
“ask the Commission to transmit to them information in its possession 
or its opinion on questions concerning the application of the Community 
competition rules”. Between 2004 and 2017, the Commission was asked 
for information/an opinion only in 34 cases.39 A significant number of 
requests was just seeking a piece of information on how advanced a pro-
ceeding conducted by the Commission was. The number of requests from 
national courts is quite low – an average of 1.2 applications per State. The 
method of cooperation provided by Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 
seems to be rather ineffective. Why? Maybe national courts prefer to solve 
their problems through the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by 
making a reference for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of 
Justice rather than by cooperating with the administrative and political 
body the Commission actually is. Anyway, the reasons for the unsatisfying 
application of Article 15(1) should have been thoroughly examined by the 
38 Anniversary Communication, paragraph 38.
39 Data available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_requests.html (January 15, 
2018).
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Commission with regard to improving a decentralised system of enforcing 
EU competition rules. 
The Commission can also stand up as amicus curiae, presenting its 
position in certain cases before national courts (Article 15(3) Regulation 
1/2003). Until the end of 2015, the Commission submitted its observations 
in 17 cases to courts in 9 Member States (none of them was Poland).40 This 
number is also very low and it probably does not reflect the real number 
of cases respecting the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU before 
national courts. Naturally, we do not require the Commission to get its 
interest in every single case before a national court, but regarding the fact 
that due to CJEU’s jurisprudence the Commission can act as amicus curiae 
either within public or private enforcement of competition law, there must 
have been much more problematic cases than just 17! If the Commission 
itself – which is absolutely the very first to guarantee a uniform applica-
tion of EU law throughout Member States – is not eager to co-operate with 
courts, it is no wonder courts do not feel much encouraged to contact the 
Commission.
3.5.2. (Non-) notification of judgments by national courts 
It was mentioned above that national institutions are obliged by a loyalty 
principle to contribute to a uniform application of EU competition law. 
Article 15(2) of Regulation 1/2003 makes this obligation even more con-
crete: it requires Member States to forward to the Commission “any writ-
ten judgment of national courts deciding on the application of Article 81 
or Article 82 of the Treaty”. Surely a common knowledge of national juris-
prudence on the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is absolutely 
desired by all parties interested in enforcing EU competition rules (includ-
ing Regulation 1/2003) – undertakings, their lawyers, and competition 
authorities themselves. Accessibility to judgments of national courts should 
be considered as a method to monitor the enforcement of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU at a national level. Unfortunately, this method did not work. The 
record of judgments available at the Commission’s website is beyond poor 
– for instance, there is no judgment of the Polish court! Member States 
totally ignored the duty to deliver judgments and the Commission did not 
use any of its instruments to force Member States to do it. One should note 
40 Data available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_amicus_curiae.html (January 
15, 2018).
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that the duty to submit a judgments is a duty imposed by Member States 
by a (binding) regulation, not (non-binding) soft law, which means that 
ignoring this duty is a direct violation of EU law. 
It would be recommendable to make the provision in Article 15(2) even 
more precise by stating that national courts should also forward to the 
Commission judgments that are not ultimate (this can be read indirectly 
in the current version of the provision: “any written judgments”). The 
idea of translating judgments into English should also be considered, as 
publishing verdicts in English could highly enhance the usefulness of the 
Commission’s record. 
3.6.  Final remarks: deficiencies of the current system of application of EU 
competition rules (not only) from the Polish standpoint
The analysis of the record of Polish antitrust decisions and jurisprudence 
allows for the conclusion that the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU has not been very intense, not to say poor. The Polish experience 
with EU competition rules does not have to be representative for all the 
Member States; still, it describes EU competition law’s related practice in 
the sixth largest country (and consumer market) in the EU. Surely, there 
may be many reasons for such a low record of Article 101 and Article 102 
TFEU cases on the Polish playground, but at least some of them result 
from difficulties in enforcing Regulation 1/2003. The fact that Poland 
belongs to the “new” Member States cannot be regarded as a real source of 
low intensity in the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as antitrust 
law developed in Poland since 1990 and was patterned on EU law from the 
very beginning, which means that the Polish competition authority has 
enough experience to apply Treaty antitrust rules successfully. Many of 
the “old” (incumbent) Member States issued their competition acts during 
that same period or just a few years later. 
The effectiveness of Regulation 1/2003 does not depend on whether it is 
enforced by a “new” or an “old” Member State. To the contrary, it should be 
concluded that deficiencies of the Regulation appear in the new States that 
joined in 2004 as well as in the old ones. If the “intensity” of the applica-
tion is to be measured with the number of preliminary rulings delivered in 
last 10 years, the assessment is rather balanced (Tele 2 and Toshiba41 from 
41 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 14 February 2012, C17/10 Toshiba Corporation and others v. 
Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže, EU:C:2012:72.
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the “new” Member States versus Vebic42 and Schenker from the “old” ones). 
Therefore, many remarks regarding the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 
presented in the article based in the Polish experience respecting the prac-
tice of application of the Regulation may also be true for other Member 
States (in terms of procedural peculiarities). 
Regulation 1/2003 cannot be considered as an effective tool for decen-
tralising the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, assuming that 
common competition rules should be applied in a uniform and consistent 
manner all over the EU. Among the reasons for this ineffectiveness are 
some inconsistencies between substantive EU and national rules, slightly 
different axiologies and goals of EU and national competition laws, and 
different sanctions for violating prohibitions of anticompetitive rules. 
Practical problems, such as the risk of multiplication of sanctions for the 
same violation in different Member States, should also be considered as 
a deficiency in the decentralised system of enforcing Treaty competition 
rules. 
4.  ECN+ Directive Proposal: does it respond to the deficiencies of 
Regulation 1/2003?
4.1. Introductory remarks
After the Commission’s evaluation of the application of Regulation 1/2003 
in 2014, it became clear that the decentralised enforcement of EU compe-
tition rules had to be strengthened. The first step was an entire review of 
Regulation 1/2003, the second was to offer Member States a new approach 
based on the alignment of the basic procedural principles to be followed 
by NCAs and courts when enforcing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. As it was 
evident that “corrections” or “amendments” of the existing law were not 
sufficient, the Commission decided to go for a harmonisation of the pro-
cedure in cases where European substantive law was to be applied.43 The 
argument that harmonising antitrust procedures in EU Member States is 
42 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 7 December 2010, C-439/08 Vebic, EU:C:2010:739.
43 See also a statement of Andreas Mundt, President of the Bundeskartellamt: “Spreading the har-
monisation of substantive law effected by Regulation 1/2003 to institutional and procedural aspects 
will serve to further strengthen the ECN authorities, and thus ensure that the EU’s unique form 
of decentralised antitrust enforcement will continue to thrive” – Adreas Mundt, “The ECN’s way 
ahead: Making decentralised antitrust enforcement waterproof”, Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice 5, no. 8 (2014): 520.
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blocked by a principle of procedural autonomy44 turned out to be weaker 
in the second decade of the 21st century than before.45 Indeed, harmonis-
ing procedural rules of public enforcement of EU competition law seems 
much less risky than – successfully completed in the form of an Antitrust 
Damage Directive46 – the harmonisation of the private enforcement of EU 
antitrust rules.
The proposal for the ECN+ Directive contains a list of gaps that – in 
the Commission’s view – need to be solved by the EU legislation. This list 
covers: (1) a lack of independence from public authority in applying EU 
law; (2) a lack of tools to detect and deal effectively with competition law 
infringements; (3) an inability to impose effective fines; (4) differences in 
leniency programmes; (5) insufficient tools for mutual assistance among 
NCAs47.
4.2.  Are there any ECN+ Directive Proposal’s responses to deficiencies from 
the Polish perspective?
4.2.1. Gaps stemming from the interpretation of substantive rules
The weaknesses of the decentralised enforcement of EU competition law 
summarised in section 3 above cover three areas of problems. The first one 
concerns various aspects of interpretation of substantive rules: the reluc-
tance of a competition authority to solve simple gaps in the interpreta-
tion of substantive rules at EU and national level, the lack of a full identity 
of the methodology for applying EU and domestic substantive rules (e.g. 
44 More on a procedural autonomy of Member States in antitrust (with a nexus to Poland) – see 
Krystyna Kowalik-Bańczyk, “Procedural autonomy of Member States and the EU rights of defence 
in antitrust proceedings”, Yearbook of Antirust and Regulatory Studies 5, no. 6 (2012): 215-234.
45 Sceptically about a possibility of harmonising procedural rules in antitrust – Kati Cseres, 
“Comparing laws in the enforcement of EU and national competition laws”, European Journal of 
Legal Studies 3, no. 1 (2010): 7-44. This author, nevertheless, claims that the analysis of the decen-
tralised enforcement system in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) points “to the need for more 
(re)-centralization, or at least for more central steering” for applying EU competition rules – see 
Kati Cseres, “The European Competition Network as experimentalist governance: The case of the 
CEECs”, Draft paper to be presented at the ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory Governance 
Conference, Barcelona, 25-27 June 2014, 20 (available at http://reggov2014.ibei.org/bcn-14-pa-
pers/34-35.pdf). 
46 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competi-
tion law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, [2014] OJ L 349/1.
47 See the Proposal for ECN+ Directive, 2-3 (under the heading: Reasons for and objectives of the 
proposal).
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presumption of  dominance in Polish law), the lack of a fully common axi-
ology at supranational and national level. 
Regarding the problem of a gap in the priorities of both the EU and 
national competition policies, Article 4(2)(e) of the draft Directive does 
not solve it, it rather strengthens it. National competition authorities are 
given total independence in setting “their priorities for carrying out tasks 
for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU as defined in Article 
5(2)”. The planned regulation provides national competition authorities 
with a power “to reject such complaints on the grounds that they do not 
consider them to be a priority”. Instead of approaching national priorities 
to EU priorities in the application of substantive competition rules, the 
draft Directive proposes a competition policy consisting of 28 (or rather 
27) national EU-related policies – this is how Article 4(2)(e) can be under-
stood. I profoundly doubt whether it really enhances uniformity in the 
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
4.2.2. Gaps related to procedures and sanctions
The second area of deficiencies of the current enforcement system con-
cerns a procedural uncertainty in cases where a simultaneous application 
of the Treaty rules and national rules is not evident because of gaps in 
procedural provisions (e.g. a gap resulting from the lack of a possibility 
to withdraw from a block exemption under Polish law). The second area 
concerns differences in sanctions. 
Regulations of procedural issues are contained in Chapter IV of the 
ECN+ Directive proposal (Article 6 - 12). It starts with a regulation on 
the powers to inspect business and non-business premises. Even the most 
revolutionary provisions herein – Article 6 and Article 7 of the draft 
Directive – bring no innovative solution to the Polish legislation. Due 
to Article 105a-105q PCA, the UOKiK enjoys a power to inspect which 
generally complies with the model proposed in Article 6 of the ECN+ 
Directive. A power to request information, prescribed in Article 8 of the 
draft Directive, is also one of the powers commonly used by the Polish 
UOKiK – its efficiency is safeguarded by relatively severe (and practically 
imposed) fines. 
The draft Directive provides (through Article 9) a national competi-
tion law with the possibility to impose behavioural or structural rem-
edies which could support an order to terminate an infringement. It is 
rather surprising, given the fact that the Commission itself imposed 
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remedies due to Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 in a few antitrust cases.48 
Nevertheless, the Polish legislator anticipated the Commission’s intent 
and from 18 January 2015 on, both behavioural and structural remedies 
can be imposed on parties of antitrust proceedings before the UOKiK on 
the basis of Article 10(4) of the Polish Competition Act (so far, the Polish 
NCA has not used its power in this regard). Other measures concerning 
undertakings’ obligations within antitrust proceedings proposed by the 
ECN+ Directive – these are interim measures (Article 10) and commit-
ments (Article 11) – are secured in the Polish system by Articles 87 and 12 
of the Polish Competition Act, respectively.  
Regulations on antitrust fines and periodic penalty payments are con-
tained in Chapter V of the ECN+ Directive Proposal. Article 106 of the 
Polish Competition Act shows a conformity with Article 12 of the draft 
Directive, which points activities subject to fines, although the Polish law-
maker is not so detailed as the Commission and does not mention breaking 
the seals fixed during an inspection as a separate basis for fining (Article 
12(2)(b) ECN+ Directive Proposal). 
What the Polish Competition Act lacks is a direct counterpart of Article 
12(3) of the ECN+ Directive Proposal, which states that: “Member States 
shall ensure that the notion of undertaking is applied for the purpose of 
imposing fines on parent companies and legal and economic successors of 
undertakings”. In my opinion, such a provision in a national competition 
law will not only ease imposing fines on entities indirectly liable for an 
infringement, but it will also somehow confirm the presence of the concept 
of a single economic unit in Polish antitrust practice and jurisprudence. 
A provision concerning a calculation of fines in case of infringements by 
associations of undertakings (Article 13(2) ECN+ Directive Proposal) will 
also be a brand new regulation in Polish antitrust law. Principles for cal-
culating fines and imposing periodic penalty payments in current Polish 
legislation are not different from the ones proposed in Articles 13(1) and 
14 of the draft Directive. 
What is extraordinarily valuable in the ECN+ Directive Proposal is the 
introduction of unified rules for leniency application (Chapter VI, Article 
16-21). In fact, the draft Directive turns a great part of the Model Leniency 
Programme worked out by ECN into a hard law. Surely, these regulations 
48 A review of Commission’s practice with behavioural remedies until the end of 2015 is sum-
marised in: Cyril Ritter, “How far can the Commission go when imposing remedies for antitrust 
infringements”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 7, no. 9 (2016): 587-598.
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on leniency do not solve problems of discrepancies between EU and Polish 
competition law concerning leniency (see III.4. above), but hopefully they 
will be an inspiration for changing the Polish model of leniency into an 
institution, being a tool for fighting secret cartels solely (not all anticom-
petitive agreement). Article 22 of the ECN+ Directive Proposal provides 
the possibility to establish a proper relation between liability of undertak-
ings and liability of natural persons for infringements of competition rules 
in terms of antitrust law efficiency. The introduction of such a regulation 
will be of great benefit for the application of both EU law and a domes-
tic law which launched a liability of natural persons for anticompetitive 
agreements (Article 6a PCA).  
4.2.3. Gaps related to inter-institutional cooperation
Cooperation between national competition authorities is addressed 
in Chapter VII of the ECN+ Directive Proposal. Mutual assistance in a 
form proposed in the draft Directive goes far beyond current possibili-
ties of cooperation between NCAs. A request for a notification of prelimi-
nary objections and decisions (Article 24) and, even more, a request for 
an enforcement (Article 25) will bring a real involvement of competition 
authorities from many Member States which will probably make the whole 
system of public enforcement of EU competition rules more coherent and 
– as a result – more effective. 
Enforcement of these new methods of cooperation is properly safe-
guarded.  Article 26 of the ECN+ Directive Proposal introduces preven-
tive measures in case of any disputes concerning such an advanced coop-
eration between national competition bodies, and Article 27 establishes 
the suspension of a limitation period for the imposition of fines in case 
of concurrent antirust proceedings before authorities in different Member 
States. Another “safety device” for an advanced cooperation is established 
in Article 29, which introduces rules on limitation of use of information 
provided in NCAs’ communications and common activities. Additionally, 
the ECN+ Directive Proposal insists on the existence of a national judi-
cial competition authority to respond to claims by national administra-
tive competition authorities (Article 28). It seems that this instruction is 
fully followed by a current institutional system for protecting competition 
in Poland. Finally, the ECN+ Directive Proposal points a list of types of 
evidence admissible before national competition authorities, and Article 
51-59 PCA in principle complies with it.
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5. Closing remarks
The future ECN+ Directive wants to introduce “necessary guarantees 
of independence and resources and enforcement and fining powers [for 
NCAs] to be able to effectively apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU” (Article 
1). Even if what W.P.J. Wils claims is true (“At least for some of the provi-
sions of the proposed Directive, it could be argued that they do not create 
any new obligations for the Member States, as the same obligation already 
flows from Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003”49), the wide scope of the 
planned ECN+ Directive is more than ambitious. However, in my personal 
view, the new regulation will not solve the majority of problems regarding 
the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by NCAs, it rather seems to 
be only a small step ahead. 
Trying to answer a key question behind this article – will the ECN+ 
Directive eliminate the deficiencies of Regulation 1/2003? – I regretfully 
say: no. As pointed above, the draft Directive hardly touches problems 
with a concurrent application of EU and national competition law by a 
national competition body. Surely, this is a subjective view stemming from 
the Polish perspective, but taking as a starting point the analysis in section 
3 of this article, the real impact on the improvement of a concurrent appli-
cation of EU and national antitrust law can be bound only with Articles 
12(3), 22, 23-27 and 29 of the ECN+ Directive Proposal. Other regulations 
will contribute to a better enforcement of competition law, but they have 
almost no significance in a tension resulting from enforcing Regulation 
1/2003 by a concurrent application of EU competition law and a national 
competition law. 
The ECN+ Directive, if adopted in the proposed version, will certainly 
improve the enforcement of competition rules in Member States, regard-
less of whether EU law is applied. Maybe the implementation of the ECN+ 
Directive will follow the same path as the implementation of the Antitrust 
Damage Directive – legal rules originally prescribed for applying EU com-
petition law were broadened to the application of national rules. 
49 Wouter Wils, “The European Commission’s “ECN+”: Proposal for a Directive to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers”, Concurrences 4 
(2017): 65.
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